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Digital Platform Policy and Regulation: 
Towards a Radical Democratic Turn 
 
Bart Cammaerts and Robin Mansell 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
This article considers challenges to policy and regulation presented by the 
dominant digital platforms. A radical democratic framing of the deliberative 
process is developed to acknowledge the full complexity of power relations 
that are in play in policy and regulatory debates and this view is contrasted with 
a liberal democratic perspective.  We show how these different framings have 
informed historical and contemporary approaches to the challenges presented 
by conflicting interests in economic value and a range of public values in the 
context of media content, communication infrastructure and digital platform 
policy and regulation. We argue for an agonistic approach to digital platform 
policy and regulatory debate so as to encourage a denaturalization of the 
prevailing logics of commercial datafication. We offer some suggestions about 
how such a generative discourse might be encouraged in such a way that it 
starts to yield a new common sense about the further development of digital 
platforms; one that might favor a digital ecology better attuned to consumer 
and citizen interests in democratic societies. 
 
Keywords: Digital platforms, media content, communication infrastructure, 
regulation, deliberation, radical democracy 
  
It is asserted in the press that the most valuable resource in our age is ‘no longer 
oil, but data’ (The Economist, 2017, np). This discourse signals a particular view of 
the economic value of digital platforms and the opportunities and threats associated 
with their operations. Attention focuses increasingly on a complex computational 
infrastructure and on the lack of transparency of its commercial operation, inspired by 
the aim of constituting citizens as datafied subjects as a result of a commercial 
datafication project (van Dijck, 2014, van Dijck, de Waal, & Poell, 2018; Mayer-
Schönberger & Ramge, 2018).1 The platform business model, favoring the scales and 
modes of operation of Alphabet’s Google, Amazon, Apple or Facebook, or of Tencent, 
                                                 
1 Following van Dijck et al. (2018, p. 4), we define a platform as ‘a programmable digital architecture 
designed to organize interactions between users’. Datafication is the ability of digital platforms using 
computerized systems to collect, circulate and process data and metadata – personal and non-personal 
- and to ‘interpret’ or predict behavior.  
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Alibaba and Baidu, is often seen as the inevitable result of technological innovation 
and the uncontrollable ‘winner takes all’ effects of network dynamics. A principal aim 
of these companies has been depicted as being to deploy ‘technologies of mass 
individualization’ (personalization) in an attention economy built upon ‘free labor’ 
(Terranova, 2000). In this type of economy, the collection and processing of personal 
and other data are regarded in much of the technology and business literature as 
constituting the quintessential ‘resource’ input that enables the financialization of data 
through the provision of services to consumers and citizens (Wu, 2016; Elmer, 2019). 
The predominant industry discourse generally emphasizes a supply side view of the 
economic potential arising from the platforms’ ownership and control of data, with 
little consideration of how, and to what end, data are gathered and used.  
 
Although consumers and citizens benefit from an information rich environment 
tailored to their apparent preferences, responsibility for securing protections against 
the actual and potential harms of online interaction with these platforms has been 
located either disproportionately with individual users or has relied largely upon the 
digital platforms’ self-regulatory measures. Scholarship critical of the dominance of 
platforms such as Google or Facebook positions them at the core of what has been 
designated as an all-pervasive ‘surveillance society’ (Lyon, 2018), propelled by 
‘platform’ and ‘surveillance’ capitalism (Srnicek, 2017; Zuboff, 2019). There is 
heightened concern among government and civil society stakeholders about the roles 
of these platforms in discriminating unfairly among their users. Discussion in Western 
democracies is focusing on which, if any, measures are needed to curtail these 
platforms’ ability to operate without mechanisms that can hold their operations 
accountable to the public (Mansell, 2015; Commission on Truth, Trust and 
Technology, 2018; Moore and Tambini, 2018). In multiple fora in the Western 
countries, government and civil society actors seem to be converging around 
legislation, codes of practice and other tools that, it is argued, will enable effective 
public oversight of the dominant platforms.2 However, the priority that public policy 
should give to conflicting economic and public values (such as privacy, freedom of 
expression, public safety and security) as it seeks to moderate the dominance of a small 
number of globally operating platforms is deeply contested among state, corporate and 
civil society actors as are the criteria which should be used to assess whether or not 
there is an empirically sustainable case for market intervention. 
 
                                                 
2 For a list of numerous government inquiries into digital platform power, see Platform Regulation 
Inquiries, Reviews and Proceedings Worldwide, 2019 at https://tinyurl.com/yy23e8p4  
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We suggest in this article that deliberations on platform policy and regulation 
are unlikely to yield measures that substantially shift the current technological 
innovation pathway away from ever more sophisticated commercial datafication 
processes that are projected by some commentators to exacerbate existing harms. This 
is because, in most of these deliberations, the underlying logics of the platforms’ 
business strategies are not being fundamentally challenged. Yet the expectation is that 
some mix of older and newer policy and regulatory responses, if implemented 
effectively, will provide assurance that the dominant platforms will be incentivized to 
operate in a manner consistent with the public interest. Uncertainty about what priority 
to accord to often conflicting public values such as freedom of speech, privacy 
protection or the untransparent biases of algorithm-driven platforms and to the  
platforms’ and states’ interests in economic value generation, as well as about the 
likely outcomes of market interventions, means that the constitution of processes of 
democratic decision-making in this area is inevitably a contentious issue. This is 
because these processes have a crucial bearing both on the behavioral and structural 
measures that are under consideration and on the way the issues are debated and 
framed. This article is addressing the debates and their framing but we do not aim to 
provide a detailed analysis of specific policy and regulatory measures. 
 
We develop an argument in support of a radical democratic turn in the way the 
policy and regulatory debates in this area are constituted. Building upon Mouffe’s 
(1999) approach to democratic agonism,3 we suggest that contemporary debates about 
digital platform policy and regulation need to be understood and constituted as 
processes of continuous contention rather than, principally, as processes intended to 
balance the conflicting values that inform stakeholder interests. If there is to be hope, 
not only of implementing policies and regulations that mitigate the harmful features of 
today’s digital platform operations, but also, and essentially, of denaturalizing the 
taken-for-granted logics or ‘common sense’4 notions about the future development of 
digital platforms this turn is essential. We suggest how policy and regulatory debate 
                                                 
3 Mouffe (1999) distinguishes agonism from antagonism. In the latter, political enemies are considered 
illegitimate. Agonism, however, acknowledges the political legitimacy of the other while reserving the 
right to fundamentally disagree. We build upon Mouffe’s theory in this article by engaging with her 
processual account of the political as an inherently conflictual space, with the role of democracy being 
precisely to turn antagonism into agonism. We do not rely on Carl Schmitt’s treatment of these issues 
since our view is that his treatment is problematic given his role as a Nazi ideologue (see also 
Smolenski, 2012). 
4 Our understanding of ‘common sense’ is informed by Taylor’s (2004) reference to the deeper notions 
that underpin the ordering of society and by Gramsci’s (1971) notion of cultural hegemony. 
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might become generative of alternatives to the digital platforms’ mass 
individualization strategies which are leading to the intensification of the commercial 
datafication of citizens’ and consumers’ lives.  
 
We start with a discussion of our theoretical framework in the next section, 
followed by a review of the rationales used historically to justify the policy and 
regulatory treatment of the media content (mainly broadcasting) and communication 
(network provider) industries and the articulation of these rationales in the 
contemporary period of digital platform dominance, highlighting conflicts among 
values which have informed various market interventions. The way our theoretical 
framework informs a move towards a radical democratic deliberation process to 
underpin responses to these platforms is developed in the next section. We also briefly 
sketch out several moves that might facilitate our proposed approach to digital 
platform policy and regulatory debates. The conclusion summarizes our argument by 
considering its importance as a means of denaturalizing claims about the inevitability 
of the contemporary pathway for digital platform development. 
 
A Turn to Radical Democratic Theory 
 
Traditional liberal democratic theory advocated the need for a stark 
distinction between the state and civil society and between the public and the private. 
Economic interests were subsumed under civil society in line with a Hegelian 
conception of the latter (Hegel, [1821]1952). The main role of the state in a liberal 
democracy often was understood to be protecting property and individual rights, more 
so than safeguarding social or collective interests. The collective was often regarded 
dangerous as suggested by the preoccupation of liberal theorists such as Alexis de 
Tocqueville and John Stuart Mill with the tyranny of the majority in their effort to 
sustain what they considered to be ‘justifiable privilege’ (Oldfield, 2000, p. 13). The 
experiences of fascism and communism, which in different ways fundamentally 
challenged the liberal model, only reinforced their fear of an irrational majority. This 
position subsequently led to a plea to minimize citizen’s political participation to 
voting responsible elites in and out of government (Schumpeter ([1942]1973). 
Defenders of a more participatory model of liberal democracy, in contrast, 
foregrounded the importance of rationality in political debate and favored a consensual 
solution-oriented approach to decision-making (Habermas, 1984).  
 
The interplay of traditional and elitist liberal democratic theories – in contrast 
to those who sought to privilege the collective interest in civil liberties and political 
rights (Macpherson, 1962) – ultimately led to the rise of a dominant neoliberal 
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articulation of liberal democracy whereby the state is expected to fulfill a minimal role 
of providing an institutional infrastructure that favors commercial markets, these 
markets are assumed to largely self-regulate, individuals are disaggregated from the 
collective and treated as having agency to express their preferences through 
marketized relations, and society is deemed not to exist, paraphrasing Thatcher. The 
focus on rationality and on consensus, as is prevalent in Habermassian democratic 
norms and deliberation, has meant that arguments fundamentally contesting this 
neoliberal hegemony could relatively easily be positioned as irrational and 
unreasonable; as existing outside the prevailing consensus. As such, deliberative 
mechanisms that enable consensual decision-making can delegitimize alternative and 
minority viewpoints (Mouffe, 1999).  
 
In contrast to these traditions in liberal democratic theory, radical democratic 
theory highlights, and even celebrates, the inherently conflictual nature of ‘the 
political’. It emphasizes the need to make conflicts, and competing stakeholder 
interests at the heart of conflicts, explicit in democratic debates. It pushes pluralist 
liberal theories (Dahl, 1971) that bit further which is why radical democratic theory is 
sometimes designated as radical pluralism. Conflict, however, is not seen as the 
beginning or end of a democratic process since solutions must be found and decisions 
must be made at some point. The difference is that such decisions are presented in the 
radical democratic theory tradition as temporary compromises or ‘respites in an 
ongoing confrontation’ among contested values (Mouffe, 1999, p. 755), rather than as 
a new consensus achieved through a comparatively stable balancing of interests and 
values.  
 
In this context, liberal democratic debate which informs most contemporary 
platform policy and regulatory discussions, frames discussion around the use of 
behavioral and/or structural remedies that are unlikely to fundamentally challenge the 
underlying logics of the commercial datafication project, even when they do modify 
some of the incentives facing the platform operators justified by social or political 
concerns.5  In contrast, in a radical democratic theory framing, encounters among 
                                                 
5 Liberal democratic framings, informed by neoliberalism, typically start from the position that growing 
the digital economy is essential. The challenge is to reduce or mitigate harms within that context by 
introducing behavioral remedies and requiring reasonably practical platform actions proportionate to 
the severity and scale of harms, measured using risk-based approaches. It is often assumed that it is 
feasible to give citizens control by, for instance, enabling them to switch platforms. Many of the 
responses to platform power are in essence mitigation strategies, coupled with the promise of building 
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stakeholders in such debates with differing values and expectations about how digital 
platforms should operate are regarded as being ‘political’; that is, they are understood 
as conflictual and contentious as in a liberal democratic framing, but also, and 
importantly, as agonistic. The aim of political debate is thus not to achieve a balancing 
of values, but rather to give recognition to the broadest plurality of interests and to 
render underlying conflicts visible to all by revealing that which otherwise would go 
unnoticed. In our context, the concern is with the way the underlying commercial 
datafication business model works with respect to economic value generation and 
other public values. The notion of democratic agonism requires a process that can 
enable the denaturalization of the prevailing common sense; in our case, the view that 
mass individualization, achieved by increasingly subtle and largely opaque 
manipulations of citizens’ information environments, is socially desirable and should 
be intensified, albeit subject to certain limits. It requires that evidence and arguments 
are discussed in ways that can expose the ideological underpinnings and interests that 
are being privileged in order to render that which would otherwise go unquestioned 
open to debate. In this way, the deliberative process is expected to be generative of 
alternatives to hegemonic ideas prevailing at a given time, thereby creating the 
potential for change in the societal values that are privileged in subsequent decisions.  
 
In this theoretical framing, the understanding of power differs from that which 
is central to a liberal democratic view. Radical democratic theory foregrounds a more 
complex understanding of power which is acknowledged as essentially contested. 
Power is understood to be both conflictual and solution-oriented and both productive 
and repressive (Foucault, 1980; Haugaard, 2002). Asymmetric power is conceived as 
a ‘property of systems or structures’ (Dowding, 2012, p. 119) and to reside with a 
variety of actors, but it is also situated in resistance, in the allocation of subject-
positions and in processes of knowledge production, in our case, concerning the values 
which should be privileged in a digital ecology. In a radical democratic framing of 
power, the classic distinction between power over and power to which informs liberal 
democratic theory is complicated by a view of conflictual power that highlights the 
productive co-existence of both repressive and emancipatory power.  
 
This co-existence is understood to be articulated through discursive practices 
that constitute what comes to be regarded as common sense; as that which cannot be 
questioned (Foucault, 1981; Lukes, 2005). Platforms, for example, provide 
opportunities for individuals and groups to express themselves and to exert their 
                                                 
user trust and confidence as a foundation for informed individual choice (see for example, DCMS and 
Home Dept., 2019).  
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agency (power to), but within constraints set by the design and terms and conditions 
for their use which are actively policed by these companies and enabled by the state 
(power over). When attention is additionally given to discursive practices (power 
through discourse), it becomes easier to understand how these discourses succeed in 
obscuring the harmful consequences of commercial datafication by keeping the 
underlying logics of platform business models outside the boundaries of debate. Here, 
we depict liberal democratic and radical pluralism for the purposes of our argument as 
oppositional poles, but we acknowledge that throughout the history of Western thought 
they have played out in practice in complex ways.  
 
In the next section, we highlight some of the ways in which policy and 
regulation in relation to the media content and communication infrastructure industries 
and, in the contemporary period, in relation to digital platform policy and regulation, 
historically have approached the problem of contested values, informed largely, but 
not exclusively by, the liberal democratic tradition. 
 
Historical and Contemporary Value Contestations 
 
The approach to value contestations has changed with realignments of 
stakeholder interests and with shifts in the roles expected of corporate, state and civil 
society actors (Kim & Ball-Rokeach, 2006; Mansell & Raboy, 2011). In Western 
countries, states have been crucial actors because they establish the institutional 
conditions for markets to operate and because of their authority to sanction non-
compliance with rules and norms of behavior that affect which economic or public 
values have been privileged at different times.  
 
Historical Value Contestations 
 
In the liberal democratic tradition, the particular balance achieved through 
policy and regulatory intervention among different values at different times in the 
history of the media content and communication industries has been justified by a 
variety of rationales. For example, states have employed social and cultural rationales 
to underpin measures to mitigate harms created by a lack of diversity in media content, 
seeking to establish a democratic mediated public sphere by acknowledging the public 
value of media content associated with educating and informing citizens (Dahlgren 
1995).  
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State interventions often involved public ownership of the media. 6  In 
privileging the public value of a pluralistic media content industry, legal limits were 
placed on the cross-media ownership holdings of commercial media providers (Doyle, 
2002; McChesney & Schiller, 2003). Obligations were attached by the state or its 
institutions to broadcast licensees such as requiring commercial broadcasters to 
produce quality news broadcasts, to limit advertising to children or to support local 
cultural content (Cammaerts, 2009; Gunter, Oates, & Blades, 2005). State ownership 
of telecommunication infrastructures in many countries was aimed at promoting 
access to telecommunication infrastructures for those living in rural and urban areas 
and for disadvantaged groups. When private monopolies were found to be engaged in 
unfair discriminatory pricing, limits to these practices through state intervention were 
aimed at privileging social, cultural or political commitments to the universality of 
access (Calabrese & Burgelman, 1999; Mansell & Raboy, 2011).  
 
Political rationales have been important in justifying state interventions to 
protect national and individual security, often through censorship of seditious media 
content in both peace and war time (Carruthers, 2011). The interception of 
communication messages has provided a justification for states to exercise their 
powers to protect national security using communication surveillance when it has been 
deemed to be in the citizens’ interest to protect them from crime or terrorism (Winseck, 
2018), and despite claims that citizens’ rights have been infringed. Claims that certain 
moral, ethical and religious values should be upheld have resulted in state interventions 
to curtail or ban the circulation of illegal and harmful media content in specific 
instances. Anti-blasphemy, anti-obscenity and hate speech legislation has been used to 
suppress public speech and post-publication repression has existed in cases such as 
hate speech or, for example, discourses denying the holocaust (Waldron, 2012). Yet, 
at the same time, policies have been aimed at upholding democratic rights through the 
protection of freedom of expression and of the right to individual privacy, consistent 
with liberal constitutions and with ‘the core aim of a democratic constitutional state’ 
which privileges the liberty of the individual and protects against state interference 
(De Hert & Gutwirth, 2006, p. 67). In this context, there has been a strong preference 
for protecting individual rights following Mill’s (1869, p. 94) assertion that freedom 
of expression is pivotal for the ‘mental well-being of mankind (on which all their other 
well-beings depend)’. Limits have, therefore, been placed by parliaments on law 
enforcement and other government agencies’ surveillance of citizens, consistent with 
prevailing views of the requirements for a political environment consistent with 
                                                 
6 As we are principally concerned with electronic media content in this article, the issues of press 
regulation are not addressed here. 
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democracy (Rössler, 2005; Schwartz, 2003).  
 
Policy and regulatory measures always have been contentious with regard to 
the role of the state and private sector actors. Such measures historically have involved 
a mix of structural and behavioral remedies, justified typically as representing an 
appropriate balance among stakeholder interests. This has been so despite ongoing 
disputes, for example, about the scope for viable public service media or for open 
access to networks and services. Policy and regulation were institutionalized through 
state legislation and various agencies and, increasingly under neoliberalism, through 
co-regulation (state and corporate) or industry self-regulation. Industry self-regulation 
was often justified by the argument that this approach was preferable to state industry-
specific intervention in order to respect individual agency and rational consumer 
choice (Price & Verhulst, 2005; Tambini, Leonardi, & Marsden, 2007). Policy and 
regulatory interventions frequently were, and often continue to be, justified in the 
Western democracies by the need to ‘balance’ stakeholder interests in economic value 
with their interests in public values. However, while one set of measures may have 
protected freedom of expression, simultaneously, another may have curtailed that 
freedom. This has resulted in ongoing tensions. These interventions have entailed 
varying mixes of the exercise by the state of power over private companies to achieve 
control and even repression of citizen rights, alongside the state’s power to protect 
democracy, elevating the priority accorded to public values such as freedom of 
expression or individual privacy protection, influenced  additionally by the power of 
discursive practice. 
 
Contemporary Value Contestations 
 
In the contemporary digital platform ecology, conflicts between those seeking 
to privilege economic value and those seeking to establish a workable prioritization of 
public values are resulting in substantial policy and regulatory challenges. This is only 
partly because the digital platforms do not fit easily, if at all, within the confines of 
earlier approaches to either media content (broadcasting) or communication network 
regulation. Their emergence has been facilitated until quite recently by a preference 
for self-regulation, subject also to a range of market facilitating legislation and 
exemptions. Policy makers and regulators are struggling to devise effective approaches 
to these new entities in the face of public concern about the potential and actual harms 
associated with the promulgation by industry and some branches of the state that are 
concerned about technological innovation and leadership of the platforms’ mass 
individualization model and their dominance in the global datafication marketplace 
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(Cohen, 2017). Debate is focusing on appropriate policy and regulatory responses and 
how they should be institutionally devised and constituted.  
 
The emphasis on industry self-regulation in the Western countries with a view 
to stimulating innovation in what started as nascent digital platform industry has meant 
that the platform owners have been able to privilege their ambition to generate 
economic value through the monetization of data in ways that are now being 
acknowledged to have neglected the protection of public values and citizen rights 
(Mansell, 2015; Moore & Tambini, 2018). The companies are introducing initiatives 
in the wake of advertiser and consumer resistance to their operations as well as 
pressures applied by states to modify their business practices. They have introduced 
internal codes of practice and transparency reports in their attempts to assure 
advertisers as well as states, consumers and citizens that their practices are consistent 
with public values such as individual privacy protection and the right to freedom of 
expression. These actions are increasingly, however,  regarded as  insufficiently 
responsive to the harms associated with their datafication practices and as raising 
issues about their accountability to the public (Commission on Truth, Trust and 
Technology, 2018).  
 
Under prevailing self-regulatory regimes, platform operators can exercise 
their own judgement about the priority to be given to conflicting economic and public 
values through, for example, their power to manage media content curation, subject to 
legal oversight of hate speech (Twitter Safety, 2017; Facebook, 2018; Mayer-
Schönberger & Ramge, 2018). Their relatively unconstrained growth through mergers 
and acquisitions has led to the charge that they are the ‘robber barons’ of the 21st 
Century (Wu, 2018). Yet, self-regulation, as well as moves to regulate the platforms, 
frequently seem to favor the platforms’ commercial datafication strategies which are 
often treated as the latest taken-for-granted signifiers of the appropriate way for the 
platforms to contribute to economic benefit and to the enhancement of individual well-
being.  
 
Government-led policy and regulatory processes are being considered, or 
have been introduced, in Western countries with the justification that measures are 
needed to protect consumers and citizens from harms associated with the undermining 
of public values by the platform operators. In the United States, for example, it has 
been suggested that as a means of balancing interests in freedom of expression and in 
revenue growth, the dominant platforms should be subject to public utility legislation 
with a view to treating them as conduits without regard to the nature of their digital 
content and its organisation (Crawford, 2018, np). Others have suggested that co-
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regulatory frameworks are needed to introduce incentives for the platform operators 
to behave as ‘responsible guardians’ (Gillespie, 2018) and as a way of ‘balancing’ 
economic value with public values (Marsden, 2018). Yet, at the same time, the 
prevailing common sense is that platform dominance and its associated harms are 
inevitably the outcome of network effects associated with digital market dynamics 
(Haucap & Hemeshoff, 2014). The dominance of the current digital platforms, it is 
often argued, is likely to diminish only in the wake of further technological innovation 
in a competitive (global) marketplace.  
 
In the United Kingdom and other Western countries, the exposure of 
Cambridge Analytica, the data analytics company which abused Facebook’s data 
holdings and misused personal data (Scott, 2018), has led to vigorous calls for state 
intervention, with increasing references to the need for an independent regulator 
charged with achieving a better balance between public values and the economic value 
generation interests associated with platform market ‘winner take all’ outcomes 
(Commission on Truth, Trust and Technology, 2018; Wu, 2018; Barwise and Watkins, 
2018). At the time of writing, in the United Kingdom, proposals call for measures to 
require the platforms to acknowledge a ‘duty of care’ and to abide by codes of practice 
with respect to data collection, processing and content moderation. Other proposed 
measures include requiring data portability to stimulate competition, new taxes and 
fines for non-compliance with data protection legislation (DCMS and Home Dept., 
2019). At the European Union level, the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR) was introduced to enhance the protection of personal data and the individual’s 
right to privacy and legislation is being developed to update electronic commerce 
provisions. 
 
The measures being considered (or acted upon) by individual states, the 
European Union (e.g. the GDPR, updating e-Privacy legislation, and revisions to 
commercial trading legislation and to electoral laws), go some way towards 
encouraging a new balancing of values but this process is not without contradiction 
and controversy in relation to the goals of sustaining values consistent with democracy. 
For example, in Europe, on the one hand, online engagement should be ‘free from 
interference from public authorities and powerful private actors’, but, on the other, it 
should be balanced with interventionist protections for adults and children from online 
harms (European Commission, 2018, p. 20). Nevertheless, the prevailing expectation, 
consistent with privileging individual choice within a liberal democratic framing, 
persists that individuals have the time, and will have the digital literacies and the 
motivations to secure their own interests in the wake of progressive datafication 
practices (Livingstone, 2008; Helberger, 2013).  
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Devolving responsibility to individual consumers or citizens to self-regulate 
their interactions online in order to protect themselves against privacy intrusions and 
other potential harms is consistent with the prevailing ‘common sense’, consistent with 
pressures acknowledged for some time by those concerned with the reflexive project 
of modernity and individualization more generally (Beck, Lash, & Giddens, 1994). 
Thus, policy and regulatory measures that are contemplated in response to the 
dominant digital platforms are unlikely to fundamentally destabilize the digital 
platforms’ business model of mass individualization. While new approaches leading 
to the exercise of state power over the platforms and to the exercise of its power to 
uphold citizen rights are being introduced (and contested), it is also argued that new 
measures to increase the platforms’ transparency and accountability to the public come 
‘at the cost of a deeper engagement with the material and ideological realities of 
contemporary computation’ (Ananny & Crawford, 2018, p. 974).  
 
Conflicts between public values such as public security and the right to be 
free of surveillance, and between maximizing economic value and various other public 
values such as privacy protection or freedom of expression, did not prevent market 
intervention in traditional media content or communication markets historically. 
However, framed by the precepts of the liberal democratic approach with its relatively 
narrow view of power relations, today’s policy and regulatory interventions do 
relatively little, we suggest, to tackle the risks associated with basic logics of 
datafication and commercial mass individualization. This is because the search for a 
balance among conflicting values typically occurs within a framework that regards 
these logics as inevitable under capitalism.  
 
It may be argued that the absence of a fundamental challenge to these logics 
is due to the incapacity of individual states to force globally active US-based platform 
companies to change their behavior in the contemporary struggle to balance contested 
values. However, we suggest that in the still prevailing neoliberal era, it is economic 
value accumulation, promoted through investment in technological innovation and 
celebrating applications of artificial intelligence and machine learning, that is valued 
most highly. As long as this skewed valorization persists, policy and regulatory 
measures are unlikely fundamentally to challenge the underlying hegemonic logic of 
commodity forms of datafication which is not to claim that there are no signs of 
contestation. The reticence of democratic states to intervene forcefully in the digital 
platforms’ markets in a way that might lead to a major shift in the way digital services 
and applications are provided is also explained by the risks posed to freedom of 
expression and by the difficulty of rigorously demonstrating the effects on individuals 
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or on society of the circulation of illegal or harmful digital content in society (Tucker 
et al., 2018; Nielsen, 2018). Missing from public debate is a fundamental challenge to 
the contemporary common sense about alternative pathways and a different value mix 
that might come to inform digital platform policy and regulation.  
 
To effectively challenge the hegemonic view of the digital platform ecology, 
we suggest that an agonistic democratic process holds much potential. In the next 
section we explain how a turn towards radical pluralism might be expected to alter the 
deliberative processes concerned with digital platform policy and regulation. 
 
Towards Radical Democratic Deliberation 
 
What processes are needed to enhance the likelihood that democratic 
deliberation will allow for a fundamental challenge to the logic of mass 
individualization and the commodified datafication of citizens and consumers? We 
argue that three moves are needed. The first is recognition of the need to constitute 
policy and regulatory debate within some form of independent and multistakeholder 
institution. The second is embrace of a turn to radical pluralism as discussed earlier, 
applying insights from this theoretical tradition to the practice of digital platform 
policy and regulatory deliberation. The third is practical measures which might begin 
to accomplish the first two moves. There is insufficient space in this article to develop 
detailed institutional design recommendations. Instead, we offer observations on what 
the constitution of debate about digital platform policy and regulation might entail. 
 
Multistakeholderism and Deliberation 
 
First, multistakeholder internet governance arrangements were the preferred 
way to manage conflicting state, corporate and civil society interests when it was 
designed as an open, content blind network (Franklin, 2013). These arrangements have 
been deemed to offer a means of ensuring an inclusive role for civil society actors with 
the expectation that policy introduced through this approach might be more effective 
than state, co- or self-regulatory approaches in achieving decisions about the priority 
to be given to contending economic and public values, thereby enhancing the 
legitimacy of decisions (Hemmati, 2002). Situated between representative and 
participatory democracy, multistakeholder processes in the broad field of internet 
governance also have been characterized as a means of securing an increased 
likelihood of compliance (power over) by both states and corporate providers of the 
internet’s infrastructure as well as supporting the power to secure or defend 
fundamental rights to an open internet (Dutton & Peltu, 2009; Cogburn, 2017).  
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In some cases these arrangements for internet governance have been criticized 
for becoming ‘talking-shops’ without effective leverage to secure the public interest 
(Powell, 2013), especially when procedures that may appear to ‘balance’ conflicting 
values have been found to result in the co-optation of civil society groups which then 
privilege values favored by dominant corporate (or state) actors. In other instances, the 
apparently consensual ‘spirit’ has been found to have excluded alternative outcomes 
that might have contested prevailing hegemonies, achieved, in part, through the power 
of discourse (Cammaerts, 2008; Hintz & Milan, 2009; Franklin, 2013; Hintz, Dencik, 
& Wahl-Jørgensen, 2019). Thus, policy and regulatory interventions devised through 
multistakeholder processes also implicate discursive power to provide legitimacy for 
outcomes, exceptionally resulting in an outcome that all stakeholders may regard as 
fairly ‘balancing’ all their interests. Multistakeholder approaches embrace the essential 
need to ensure democratic representation in policy and regulatory processes. We 
therefore join with others who call for the independence and inclusiveness of any 
initiatives to institute novel digital platform policy and regulatory approaches (Ananny 
& Crawford, 2018). However, this is not  a sufficient response to the problem of 
addressing value conflicts associated with contemporary digital platforms.  
 
Radical Pluralism and Digital Platform Debate 
 
As indicated earlier, policy and regulatory responses to a changing digital 
platform ecology typically have been framed by the goal of achieving a consensus on 
the best ‘balance’ among contested values. Multistakeholder approaches may have the 
potential to broker outcomes that give greater weight to certain public values, but, as 
we have argued, a denaturalization of the digital platform logics is also needed. This 
requires the capacity to contest the hegemonic common sense regarding digital 
technology and market innovation involving the unfettered commmodification of 
individuals’ data and the individualization of responsibility for the avoidance of harms. 
A second move is therefore essential if this denaturalization process is to be set in train. 
This move involves embracing a turn towards radical pluralism and the application of 
insights from this theoretical tradition to the practice of digital platform policy and 
regulatory deliberation. 
 
This turn acknowledges continuing contention over values and that discursive 
power may be repressive or emancipatory. Such an agonistic process must be open to 
debates on issues which otherwise would go largely unquestioned. In this instance, the 
overarching commitment to business models that are designed to maximize profit from 
datafication processes in ways that jeopardize Western commitments to the protection 
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of citizens’ fundamental rights, well-being and democracy. By effectively challenging 
the taken-for-granted common sense of the digital platforms, it is more likely that 
discursive practice can become generative of alternative visions for the design and use 
of digital technologies that work in support of (rather than against) democratically 
agreed public values.  
 
This move involves attention to generative discursive power to render visible 
asymmetries and biases in the construction of knowledge about, and the causes and 
consequences of, the contemporary digital platform logics. Such an approach, 
arguably, has the potential to yield a new understanding of the appropriate role of 
digital platforms in the constitution of ‘the political’ in society. Denaturalizing the 
logics of commercial datafication is likely to yield a new temporary common sense to 
guide innovations in the digital industry’s market structure and business practices as 
well as in non-commercial service and applications that might be more responsive to 
the requirements of a democracy.  
 
Policy and regulatory debates aimed at challenging the logic of commercially 
sponsored mass individualization, ultimately, would not balance out value conflicts 
between security and privacy, between freedom of speech and its limits, or between 
commercial interests and public concerns. These value conflicts would continue to 
assert themselves, but this move would make policy and regulatory proposals 
explicitly subject to agonistic democratic debate. A radical agonistic process could 
stimulate debate about the very nature of the digital platform datafication model and 
its implications for individual and collective well-being by invoking discursive power 
to probe the contemporary common sense.  
 
Practical Implications of a Turn to Radical Pluralism 
 
The third move is a set of practical measures which might begin to accomplish 
the first two moves. The radical democratic pluralism framing of digital platform 
policy and regulatory issues suggests practical applications because it calls for a 
change in the constitution of the process of deliberation with regard to digital platform 
policy and regulation. Debate predicated upon the assumption that there is a need to 
do more than pursue a balance among conflicting values would enable questions and 
solutions to be discussed that are not typically part of the conversation, precisely 
because they impact on the commercially sensitive interests of the digital platform 
companies.  
 
Thus, questions guiding a denaturalization process of the prevailing digital 
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platform common sense might include: should platform company designed-in 
infringement of their end users’ privacy for commercial purposes be severely restricted 
or even disallowed? Should these companies be banned from profiting from the 
dissemination of hate-speech and misinformation? Is there a case for the development 
of public service platforms to support online search and social interaction in Europe 
and elsewhere? Should the use of algorithms and machine learning in certain socially 
impactful contexts be limited until such time as there is a realistic possibility of 
auditing outcomes? Debate on these issues is more likely to be generative of alternative 
approaches to the provision of digital services and applications than is the case when 
these issues remain outside the framing of debate. Contemporary common sense ideas 
about how citizen and consumer agency and freedom to choose are constituted by the 
digital ecologies of Western democratic societies need to be probed if taken-for-
granted knowledge about these platforms is to be denaturalized and challenged more 
effectively.  
 
There are, of course, calls for alternative uses of digital technologies and 
approaches to their provision that might help to counter the dominant platforms such 
as civil society platform and/or data ownership. Such proposals may go some way 
towards giving a higher priority to public values (Trottier & Fuchs, 2015), but most 
such proposals also embrace datafication using far from transparent automated 
machine learning processes, albeit in ways that are much less dependent on the 
commercial logic of profit. The challenge is to design means of broadening the basis 
for, and the likelihood of, a more penetrating critique of the prevailing common sense 
about these developments. However, this will require a turn to a deliberative process 
that enables a denaturalization which can call explicit attention to the problems 
inherent within the prevailing common sense as a guide to policy and regulatory 
intervention.  
 
We suggest that such a turn to radical pluralism is more likely to mobilize a 
broader debate - one that distinguishes between debate framed largely within the 
existing platform business model context and the technology innovation context, and 
debate that is designed explicitly to be generative of alternatives. These might include 
new technology innovation directions and alternative approaches to the supply and 
use of digital platform services and applications. In this context, it is not only the 
state’s power over the existing platforms or its power to protect consumer and citizen 
rights which are at stake. It is also, and importantly, discursive power and practices as 
generative of novel approaches that are implicated too. 
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Practical steps toward a revised framing of digital platform policy and 
regulatory debates consistent with radical pluralism might include, for example, the 
integration of mainly separate debates about artificial intelligence, machine learning 
innovation and their ethical development and deployment with debates about the 
dominant digital platforms’ role in datafication processes in existing markets. Other 
steps would involve explicit recognition of discursive practices – both repressive and 
emancipatory. This would help to make explicit the fact that many currently proposed 
policy and regulatory responses to digital platform power have contradictory 
consequences for economic value generation and for upholding public values 
(privacy, freedom of expression, etc), often heightening rather than reducing the risk 
of citizen’s rights infringement.  
 
An additional step would be to ensure that independently constituted and 
fully representative bodies are charged with monitoring and critically assessing the 
impacts of responses to platform power. In this we join with scholars calling for 
research to evidence the actual and potential harms associated with the ongoing 
intensification  of commercial datafication processes. This requires attention to the 
incentives facing the dominant platforms, not only in terms of their impact, but also 
in the light of alternative models and approaches, including non-market provision and 
pausing or halting the offer of certain technologically feasible services and 
applications. Processes are also needed that would provide for active mediation among 
stakeholders, for example, by organising public hearing at given intervals, convening 
focus groups with the general public, and hosting media campaigns explaining 
contentious issues and why they matter for the welfare of citizens in Western 
democracies.  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that a principal aim of debate about the role of the dominant 
digital platforms in Western democracies must be to denaturalize the prevailing 
hegemonic commitment to the idea that the benefits of datafication for consumers and 
citizens through intensified mass individualization within a digital ecology necessarily 
will come to outweigh the risks to citizens and democracy. The radical turn we 
advocate is the realization that any ‘balancing’ of economic and public values needs 
to occur within a context that allows for a reframing of ‘common sense’ notions about 
whether and how digital platforms foster individual autonomy and collectively held 
values in democratic societies.  
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The outcomes of a radical democratic approach to digital platform policy 
and regulation cannot be foreseen. However, the timing is ripe for the moves we 
propose. Various scholars are claiming that the current digital technology pathway 
pursued by the dominant platforms is leading towards less transparent, and yet more 
pervasive and harmful, processes of commercial datafication (Mansell, 2017; Cohen, 
2017; van Dijck et al., 2018; Couldry & Mejias, 2019; Zuboff, 2019). There are 
instances of blocking (at least temporarily) the transition of technology innovations, 
such as face recognition in public spaces, to the market. There are controversies about 
the chilling effects of some regulatory measures on speech freedoms. And there are 
signs of a renewed impetus towards investigation of the case for breaking up the 
dominant digital platforms. Thus, there is momentum in Western democracies which 
is starting to destabilize the prevailing common sense about the virtues of a capitalist 
market-driven technology innovation pathway.  
 
The radical turn we propose requires a move beyond a refashioning of policy 
and regulation to achieve a rebalancing of economic and public values in the 
contemporary digital platform era. It envisages a more explicit recognition of intrinsic 
and unresolvable conflicts among contested values, underpinned, additionally, by an 
agonistic process that might enable a denaturalization of the prevailing knowledge 
hegemony concerning digital platforms and their role in society. Through generative 
agonistic debate, it may become feasible to build a new (temporary) common sense 
about the provision of digital platform service and application that is more consistent 
with democratic precepts, including respect for citizens’ fundamental human rights. If 
responses to the digital platforms’ operations do not alter the pathway of future 
developments, policy and regulatory responses in the liberal democratic tradition are 
likely to continue to be reactive within the logics of the digital platforms’ datafication 
project. Alternatives, consistent with an emancipated citizenry and, indeed, with the 
precepts of Western democracy, we argue, are more likely to emerge through processes 
of debate that acknowledge the constitution of ‘the political’ and, therefore, the need 
for policy and regulatory debate that is constituted in the manner we propose. 
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